

~~SECRET~~*Dep Dir*  
*HM*NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY  
Office of The Director  
Fort George G Meade, Maryland

5 March 1958

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-14-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

## MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL ERSKINE:

1. There is considerable evidence that we in NSA do not keep all the people concerned with our management adequately informed. You mentioned on Friday last that there had been a complaint that we dealt too much with the cryptologic agencies. The feeling that we were remiss in the Arctic Conference matter is another example.

2. I believe that our failure in this sort of thing is due in part to there being so many different people to whom we must be responsive with management-type information. This situation is illustrated as follows.

a. Within the Department of Defense we report to:

- (1) The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special Operations) as the individual who represents our business across the board in the Department of Defense.
- (2) The members of the Robertson Committee as the individuals who are currently making high-level recommendations on all aspects of our business.
- (3) The members of the Research and Development family as the individuals concerned directly with our Research and Development policy and opportunity, and with our coordination responsibility in this field.
- (4) Certain members of the Comptroller family (primarily DOD Comptroller and DA Comptroller) as the individuals who must approve our fiscal and budget management.
- (5) The separate Commanders of the Cryptologic Agencies as the individuals who are considered our basic partners in the matter of using military cryptologic resources.

(Continued on next page.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

(Continued)

- (6) The members of JCEC as the individuals who must approve our Communications policy and the use of Communications resources.
- (7) The members of SOPAG as the individuals who are planned to take over much of the functions being performed by the members of the Robertson Committee.

b. Outside the Department of Defense we report to:

- (1) Certain individuals associated with the White House (Cutler, Killian, Baker) as the individuals who sometimes exercise an overriding influence on many aspects of our business.
- (2) The members of USCIB as the individuals who control our intelligence policy.
- (3) The members of the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence as the individuals who sometimes exercise an overriding influence on our intelligence policy.
- (4) The members of the USCSB as the individuals who control our COMSEC policy.
- (5) Certain members of the Bureau of the Budget who sometimes exercise an overriding influence on our fiscal business.
- (6) Certain members of the Civil Service Commission who exercise a high degree of authority over our usages of civilian personnel.
- (7) The members of the Congressional Committee on publishing and printing who exercise overriding authority over our publishing and printing resources.
- (8) Certain members of Congress who exercise overriding authority on our budget.
- (9) Our foreign collaborators (UK, Canada, Australia) who are our extra national partners in the matter of using cryptologic resources and in the matters of international COMINT policy.

(Continued on next page.)


~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~


(Continued)

3. Since each of the groups identified above has a membership that is unique to itself the complexity of our problem is considerable. We cannot hope to reach all of the individuals even in the Department of Defense through any one mechanism. However, I believe that you created SOPAG for the purpose of providing a mechanism through which much of our business within the Department of Defense could be accomplished.

4. I propose, therefore, to have NSA concentrate to the best of its ability on keeping at least the members of SOPAG adequately informed. I would like to ask that they be provided with the substance of this memorandum and that they be urged to consider themselves as being the primary focus of NSA management-type information within the Department of Defense.



JOHN A. SAMFORD  
Lieutenant General, USAF  
Director

cc: DIR  
DDIR   
C/S & DC/S  
DIR/PROD  
DIR/R&D  
DIR/CSEC  
QPS  
AG (2)

Orig by DIR.

M/R: Self-explanatory.

WAS.

~~SECRET~~